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WHEN IS EMPLOYEE BLOGGING PROTECTED 
BY SECTION 7 OF THE NLRA? 
KATHERINE M. SCOTT1
ABSTRACT 
The National Labor Relations Act forbids employers from 
retaliating against certain types of employee speech or intimidating 
those who engage in it.  This iBrief examines how blogging fits into 
the current statutory framework and recommends how the National 
Labor Relations Board and the courts should address the unique 
features of employee blogs. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Blogging has tremendous potential to shift the balance of power 
from employers to employees, as employees gain the ability to 
communicate their concerns to other employees, customers, neighbors, 
stockholders, and other parties interested in the employer.2  While many 
businesses already communicate with the public through well-organized, 
well-funded marketing and public relations departments, employees now 
have an inexpensive way to get their own messages out to the public—a 
factor of rising importance in modern labor disputes.3  While employers can 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2007; M.S. in Industrial 
Engineering and Operations Research, The Pennsylvania State University, 1999; 
B.S. in Mathematical Sciences, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1997.  
The author would like to thank Professor Catherine Fisk for her advice and 
encouragement, and Sylvia Winston, Chin Pann and the other DLTR editors for 
very helpful and constructive writing suggestions.  
2 See, e.g., Doug Tsuruoka, AOL Blogging Site Gathers Information on Popular 
Stocks, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 17, 2006, at A06 (describing a new 
website that tracks employee blogs to help investors evaluate stocks); EDELMAN 
& INTELLISEEK, TALKING FROM THE INSIDE OUT:  THE RISE OF EMPLOYEE 
BLOGGERS 3 (2005), http://www.edelman.com/image/insights/content/Edelman-
Intelliseek%20Employee%20Blogging%20White%20Paper.pdf (“The rise of 
the blogosphere has the potential to empower employees in ways not unlike the 
rise of labor unions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.”); W-WAssociates, 
Welcome, http://groups.msn.com/W-WAssociates/welcome.msnw (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2006) (“Customers are more than welcome here.”). 
3 See Melinda J. Branscomb, Labor, Loyalty, and the Corporate Campaign, 73 
B.U. L. REV. 293, 294 (1993) (referring to “today’s corporate campaign, in 
which employees and their unions relentlessly advance by verbal warfare on the 
target employer and its agents for the purpose of enlisting the public as allies in 
their cause”). 
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already send messages to employees through their own communication 
channels, employees now have a new means of discussing issues with each 
other, regardless of the obstacles presented by differently-timed shifts, 
physically separated workplaces, and the operational demands of work. 
¶2 Blogs allow an unprecedented visibility, participation, and volume 
of communication.  A blogger can reach members of the public who do not 
visit the employer’s business or walk by a protest.  Also, a blogger can 
communicate with co-employees in different work locations4 and even with 
employees of other employers5 without having to obtain their contact 
information.  The information posted on a blog can come from multiple 
sources because readers often post comments,6 and large amounts of text 
and links to other sites make detailed information more accessible.  Anyone 
reading the blog can see the factual support for or interest in any idea that is 
posted.  Finally, the anonymity of the Internet allows employees to explore 
information about a labor dispute and test the waters without having to 
reveal their identities.7       
¶3 As blogging has grown in popularity, employer concern about 
blogging has grown, and some employees have already been fired for their 
blogs.8  Employees can disclose trade secrets,9 confidential financial 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., W-WAssociates.com, supra note 2 (“If you are a Wal-Mart/Sam’s 
Club associate or former associate then this is the place for you to come and 
share your good and bad experiences about Wal-Mart.”).  
5 See, e.g., Washtech.org, Washington Alliance of Technology Workers, 
http://www.washtech.org/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2006) (“From Silicon Valley to 
Boston, high-tech workers are joining our national network-to raise our voice 
and make a difference.”). 
6 See Mark Glaser, What Really Makes a Blog Shine, in REPORTERS WITHOUT 
BORDERS, HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 33, 34 (2005), 
http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf. 
7 See Alison Young, CDC Will Examine Fairness of Bonuses, ATLANTA 
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 19, 2006, at 1A, available at 
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/atlanta/stories/2006/09/18/0919cdccas
h.html (referring to anonymous employee postings on the cdcchatter.net blog in 
reference to allegations of improper cash bonus awards to certain employees at 
the Centers for Disease Control, including a post calling upon “employees and 
others . . . to voice our utter disgust and stop this corruption”); cf. Snap-On 
Tools, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,708, 2004 
NLRB LEXIS 314, at *33–*34 (2004) (finding an unfair labor practice when an 
employer focused a surveillance camera on handbillers, which “prevented 
employees who desired to receive union literature anonymously from doing 
so”).  
8 See, e.g., PROOFPOINT, OUTBOUND EMAIL AND CONTENT SECURITY IN 
TODAY’S ENTERPRISE 2 (2006) (revealing that 7.1 percent of the large U.S. 
companies surveyed had fired at least one employee for violating blog or 
message board policies in the past year), cited in Del Jones, Sun CEO Sees 
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information,10 or other internal documents;11 put the employer in an 
embarrassing light by abusing its trademarks,12 or projecting a negative or 
otherwise unprofessional attitude;13 disrupt the workplace with public 
comments about other employees;14 or offend the employer’s customers by 
making racist, sexist, or otherwise inappropriate remarks.15   
¶4 Despite these concerns, various laws limit an employer’s control 
over what employees write, especially outside of working hours.16  One 
such law is the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which protects 
                                                                                                                       
Competitive Advantage in Blogging, USA TODAY, June 26, 2006, at 7B; 
EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 12–13; Carson Strege-Flora, Wait! 
Don’t Fire That Blogger! What Limits Does Labor Law Impose on Employer 
Regulation of Employee Blogs?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 11, ¶ 4 (Dec. 16, 
2005), http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a011Strege.html; Konrad 
Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging:  Employee Breach of the Duty of Loyalty and the 
Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger’s Identity Before Service of 
Process is Effected, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0002, ¶¶ 20–22 (Jan. 17, 
2006), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2006DLTR0002.pdf. 
9 John P. Hutchins, Beyond the Water Cooler: Does Corporate Blogging 
Change the Legal Landscape?, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 14, 2005, at 45, 46.  
10 Id.; Ephraim Schwartz, Bloggers and the Law, INFOWORLD, May 3, 2005, 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/05/03/19OPreality_1.html. 
11 See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney, 1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 3 (Feb. 10, 1999), 
available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/l021099_pratt19753.as
p (relating that employee posted internal memorandum on his website). 
12 See, e.g., EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13 (recounting that a 
flight attendant was fired for posting a picture of herself “in uniform . . . with 
her blouse unbuttoned far wider than the company’s dress code specified”). 
13 See, e.g., Colin Randall, Wrote Blog and Got the Sack.  V Bad.  Will Sue., 
DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 18, 2006, International, at 17 (describing the firing of a 
secretary who wrote a “Bridget Jones in Paris” blog about her work at an 
accounting firm); Fthisjob.com, http://www.fthisjob.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 
2006) (“Welcome to fthisjob.com, the ‘I hate my job’ blogging community.”). 
14 Sarah Vos & Jamie Gumbrecht, Web Sites Personal, but Millions See Them, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Kentucky), Mar. 30, 2006, at A1 (“[A] California 
auto club fired 27 people for comments made about other employees’ weight 
and sexual orientation.”). 
15 See, e.g., Richard Wray, “Lefty Lexicon” Lands Orange Executive in Big 
Trouble, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 17, 2006, at 13 (noting the suspension of a 
community affairs manager for posting anti-Islamic remarks); Employee Blogs, 
ADVANCE NEWS MAGAZINES FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS, Nov. 1, 2005, 
available at http://nurse-
practitioners.advanceweb.com/common/editorial/PrintFriendly.aspx?CC=62666. 
16 See, e.g., id.; Lee, supra note 8, at n.46 (referring to whistleblower 
protections).  
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certain activities by non-supervisory private sector employees.17  
Specifically, section 7 of the NLRA protects “the right . . . to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”18  
Employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of” their section 7 rights.19  These provisions likely extend to 
employee blogs under certain circumstances.20 
¶5 Blogs present courts with a new context in which to strike the 
balance between employee and employer rights. This iBrief focuses on 
employee blogging during personal time without the aid of an employer’s 
property.  The iBrief recommends that courts recognize employees’ 
criticisms of their employer on blogs as protected concerted activity, and 
argues that existing case law examining unfair labor practices readily 
applies to the blogging context.   
I.  PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
A.  What Kind of Activities Are Protected? 
¶6 The NLRA protects “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or 
protection”21 by most private-sector, non-supervisory employees.22  These 
protections apply in unionized and non-unionized workplaces; no union or 
organizing campaign is necessary.23  This section will summarize the basic 
law describing when employee activities are protected under section 7 of 
the NLRA. 
 
                                                     
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 160(a) (2000); see also Brian Christensen & David M. 
Kight, Section 7 and the Non-Union Employer, 60 J. MO. B. 312, 312 & nn.6–7 
(2004). 
18 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). 
19 Id. § 158(a). 
20 See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Blogger’s FAQ: Labor Law, 
http://www.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-labor.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2006); Lee, 
supra note 8, at n.47; Strege-Flora, supra note 8; see also W-WAssociates, 
http://groups.msn.com/W-WAssociates/disclaimerlegalpage.msnw (informing 
Wal-Mart employees they are protected if they “are posting honestly what is 
going on at [their] store about [their] working conditions”) (last visited Sept. 24, 
2006). 
21 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). 
22 Id. § 152(2) (excluding federal, state, and municipal governments and unions 
from the definition of “employer”); id. § 152(3) (excluding “any individual 
employed as a supervisor” from the definition of “employee”).
23 NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948). 
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1.  What is Concerted Activity? 
¶7 For an employee’s action to be “concerted,” he or she must act 
with, or as authorized by, other employees.24  The “definition of concerted 
activity . . . encompasses those circumstances where individual employees 
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action,”25 sometimes 
including situations when an employee implies, but does not expressly state, 
a request for other employees to act.26  Concertedness also exists when an 
employee’s action is a “logical outgrowth” of previous group activity.27 
2.  What is Mutual Aid or Protection? 
¶8 Concerted activities are protected only when done “for mutual aid 
or protection.”28  Historically, this has meant a “self-interested economic 
objective”29 such as improved pay, hours, safety, or workload, rather than 
concerns such as product quality30 or environmental damage.31  However, 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1288 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(“[T]he relevant question is whether the employee acted with the purpose of 
furthering group goals.”), quoted in William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor 
Law of the Twenty-First Century, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 292 
(2002); see also Int’l Transp. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 449 F.3d 160, 166 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (denying protection to an employee who picketed for a one-person 
bargaining unit); NLRB v. Hotel Employees Int’l Union Local 26, 446 F.3d 200, 
207 (1st Cir. 2006) (“To qualify as concerted activity, ‘[i]t is sufficient that the 
[complaining] employee intends or contemplates, as an end result, group activity 
which will also benefit some other employees.’” (quoting Koch Supplies, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 646 F.2d 1257, 1259 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
25 Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
26 Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247–48 (1997) (finding that an 
employee’s email to his coworkers about a proposed change in company 
vacation policy to be concerted activity because he “was attempting to correct 
any misimpression . . . and to arouse support for his own decision to oppose the 
proposal”); see also Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 17-CA-21603, 2002 NLRB 
LEXIS 485, at *27 (Sept. 30, 2002) (holding employee’s warning about anthrax 
risk in the workplace to be concerted), aff’d 339 N.L.R.B. 1012 (2003).   
27 Every Woman’s Place, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 413, 413 (1986) (finding 
employee’s call to Department of Labor was concerted because she and her co-
workers had already brought their concern to management’s attention at least 
four times); see also Five Star Transp., Inc., No. 1-CA-41158, 2004 NLRB 
LEXIS 329, at *21 (June 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD-60-04.pdf (finding that 
letters written by individual employees were a “logical outgrowth” of an earlier 
meeting).  
28 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).  
29 Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want?  Employee Interest, Public 
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 
140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 928 (1992); see also Corbett, supra note 24, at 282–83. 
30 Estlund, supra note 29, at 949. 
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courts sometimes look broadly at employee motives to find self interest 
even when concerns for customers, neighbors, or other employers’ workers 
also exist and even predominate within the communication.32   
3.  Exceptions to NLRA Protections 
¶9 “[E]mployee communications to third parties in an effort to obtain 
their support are protected where the communication indicate[s] it is related 
to an ongoing dispute . . . and the communication is not so disloyal, reckless 
or maliciously untrue as to lose the Act’s protection.”33  Though the 
meaning of “disloyalty” is hotly debated,34 certain categories of speech 
have emerged as being unprotected:  (1) remarks that disparage the 
employer or its products,35 (2) confidentiality breaches36 and (3) recklessly 
or maliciously false accusations.37 
¶10 Courts have applied different tests to determine when negative 
remarks about the employer or its products fall under section 7’s 
disparagement exception.  In general, disparaging “appeals to third parties 
forfeit [section] 7 protection only if their connection to the employees’ 
working conditions is too attenuated or if they are unrelated to any 
                                                                                                                       
31 See id. at 956.  Estlund provides a powerful critique of the historically narrow 
construction of “mutual aid or protection” based on the legislative history of the 
Wagner Act, the realities of modern work, and the public interest.  See id. at 
942–67. 
32 See, e.g., Five Star, No. 1-CA-41158, 2004 NLRB LEXIS at *11, *25–*26 
(holding that school bus drivers whose letters expressed concern for children’s 
safety were protected, so long as their letters also expressed concern for the bus 
drivers’ own wages and job security); Estlund, supra note 29, at 927–28, 936–
38. 
33 Am. Golf Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 1238, 1240 (2000).  The case widely cited as 
establishing the disloyalty exception is NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 
(Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), in which a broadcasting station’s 
employees were unprotected when they passed out a handbill criticizing their 
employer’s programming.  See, e.g., Branscomb, supra note 3, at 300–01. 
34 See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1989); 
Branscomb, supra note 3, at 295. 
35 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 211 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. 
eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. 
36 Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in 
Traditional and Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 855 (2003); 1 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 207 
37 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 210; see, e.g., TNT Logistics N. 
Am., Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 287, at *7–*8 (July 24, 
2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/347/347-
55.pdf.  
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grievance which the workers may have.”38 Although the tenor of the 
language seems to be a factor in the analysis,39 several Courts of Appeals 
and the NLRB have found employee speech protected even when that 
speech uses harsh language.40  The D.C. Circuit, however, recently held that 
an employee’s remarks lost the protection of section 7 when those remarks, 
which supported a union and protested recent layoffs, “constituted ‘a sharp, 
public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s product and its 
business policies’ at a ‘critical time’ for the company.”41 
¶11 The scope and rationale of the disparagement exception is unclear.  
Some courts seem to believe that only managers, and not employees, have a 
legitimate interest in product quality and the employer’s impact on the 
community.42  Under that interpretation, any criticism must be framed as a 
concern about working conditions to be protected.43  Another theory 
suggests that the exception arises from fear that employees will deceive the 
                                                     
38 Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 216 (citing examples); accord Am. Golf Corp., 
330 N.L.R.B. at 1241 (finding unprotected an employee’s handbill suggesting 
that the town hire a different contractor because it did not mention the 
employee’s labor dispute with the contractor). 
39 See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 217 (“[D]espite the criticisms voiced 
in the [employees’] letter, the tone was both constructive and hopeful.”).   
40 See, e.g., id. at 218 (citing examples); Emarco, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 
(1987) (finding that when employees said to their employer’s client that the 
employer was “no damn good” and “couldn’t finish the job,” the employees 
were engaged in protected activity because they were explaining their strike to 
protest the fact they had not been paid for five months). 
41 Endicott Interconnect Techs. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 
471 (1953)) (holding the employee’s remarks unprotected when he cast doubt on 
the struggling manufacturer’s continuing business viability, writing that the 
business was being “tanked” and its managers were going to “put it into the 
dirt”), rev’g 345 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 16,971, 
2005 NLRB LEXIS 443, at *20 (Aug. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/345/345-28.pdf (holding that an 
employer’s “sensitivity to the possible impact” of an employee’s remarks does 
not “serve to limit [an employee’s] statutory right to appeal to the public”). 
42 See Estlund, supra note 29, at 949 (“Current doctrine is based on the premise 
that employees are not advancing their interests as employees when they 
criticize their employer’s products or services.”); see also id. at 930 (discussing 
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229 (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464 (1953), in 
which a handbill criticizing only the quality of the employer’s television and 
radio programming was unprotected). 
43 See, e.g., Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 220 (“[S]uggestions that a company’s 
treatment of its employees may have an effect upon the quality of the company’s 
products, or may even affect the company’s own viability” may be protected.). 
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public into exerting economic pressure on their employer.44  Therefore, a 
court may find unrelated product criticisms protected as long as the 
communication also reveals the employees’ dispute with their employer.45 
¶12 Breaches of confidentiality are another category of unprotected 
communication.  Although employees cannot be prohibited from discussing 
their own working conditions,46 they are not protected when disseminating 
information obtained in confidence or without authorization, even when it 
concerns terms and conditions of employment.47  
¶13 False statements remain protected as long as the employee making 
the statements does so neither knowingly nor recklessly.48  An employee 
who has no reason to question the information that he or she merely passes 
along from someone else has no duty to investigate its truthfulness because 
such a duty would unacceptably chill employee speech under section 7.49  
Yet employees have no right under the NLRA to propagate lies knowingly 
or recklessly.50  Therefore, an overly excited employee who spreads 
                                                     
44 See Estlund, supra note 29, at 981 (“Objections to the purely tactical use of 
product disparagement and other ‘public-oriented’ criticism of the employer of 
the sort illustrated by Jefferson Standard [346 U.S. 464] may reflect as well a 
fear that the public may be unfairly duped into supporting labor’s cause.”). 
45 See Sierra Publ’g Co., 889 F.2d at 217 (“[T]hird parties who receive appeals 
for support in a labor dispute will filter the information critically so long as they 
are aware it is generated out of that context.”), quoted in Estlund, supra note 29, 
at 935 n.74. 
46 See, e.g., King, supra note 36, at 857–59 (describing, inter alia, Kinder-Care 
Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1176 (1990) (daycare working 
conditions) and Phoenix Transit Sys., 337 N.L.R.B. 510, 510 (2002) (sexual 
harassment complaints)); see also Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social 
Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 43 n.14 (2005) 
(listing cases discussing wage confidentiality policies).  
47 See NLRB v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 919 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (wage 
data stolen from supervisor’s office); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 
826 (1998) (“hotel-private” information such as “guest information, trade 
secrets, [and] contracts with suppliers”).  
48 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 883 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Federal labor law protects even false and defamatory statements unless such 
statements are made with actual malice—i.e., knowledge of falsity or with 
reckless disregard for the truth.”  (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. 
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281 (1974) and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 
U.S. 53, 61 (1966))).  
49 See KBO, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 570, 571 & n.6 (1994) (holding that an 
employee who “relay[ed] to [other employees] in good faith what he had been 
told” by another employee was protected by section 7, even though the 
information turned out to be false). 
50 See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1012 n.2 (2003); 
KBO, 315 N.L.R.B. at 570. 
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harmful and sensitive rumors that he or she should know are false will not 
be protected.51   
B.  How Courts Should Construe Protection of Blogging 
¶14 For blogging to be protected as section 7 activity, it must be 
concerted, for mutual aid or protection, and not within one of the exceptions 
discussed above.  This section of the iBrief addresses how such standards 
should apply to blogs, finding considerable room to treat some blogging as 
a “concerted activity,” endorsing a broad scope for “mutual aid or 
protection,” and recommending that courts evaluate a blog as a whole, 
rather than post by post, when deciding whether statements on the blog are 
protected under the NLRA. 
¶15 When evaluating concertedness, courts should continue to apply a 
broad standard, so that blogs where employees discuss work concerns meet 
this initial threshold criterion for protection.  Certainly, if multiple 
employees create a draft together with the intent of posting it, then their 
activity is literally and obviously concerted,52 and if two or more employees 
have been complaining about particular working conditions and one alerts 
the public by blogging about it, then this is a “logical outgrowth” of 
concerted activity.  In addition, an employee who posts without previously 
consulting his co-workers could be seen as initiating group action by 
inviting his co-workers to share their concerns.53  The presence of a 
comment feature on most blogs arguably implicitly invites others to 
participate in the discussion, but to find a blog protected, a court should 
have to find that the blog at least implies that co-employees are the intended 
                                                     
51 Although a nurse’s televised statements that hospital policies endangered 
patients did not spring from “an evil motive,” they were unprotected because 
they were “materially false and misleading” and “made her continued 
employment untenable” due to her co-workers’ outrage.  Id. at 578–82; see also 
Sprint, 339 N.L.R.B. at 1015–16, 1018–19 (finding email warning co-workers of 
anthrax unprotected because sender was reckless with respect to the truth or 
falsity of three claims and “fabricated” two others). 
52 See Ogihara Am. Corp., No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555, at *10, 
*42 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD-80-05.pdf (finding that 
an employee’s sending of a letter he composed with feedback from other 
employees was concerted).  
53 See Strege-Flora, supra note 8, ¶ 12. 
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audience.54  The presence of actual comments or links from other 
employees’ blogs may also create concertedness. 55 
¶16 Unlike the analysis of concertedness, the analysis of the “mutual aid 
or protection” requirement does not depend upon the characteristics of 
blogging as a medium.  How courts interpret the scope of protection will be 
critical in practice, though, so two particular issues merit discussion.  First, 
it is currently unclear whether, outside the union context, distributing 
“political” literature about laws affecting working conditions is always 
unprotected, or whether the distribution is merely unprotected at the 
workplace.56  Some employee bloggers will probably refer to political 
changes affecting their workplaces and include links to or material from 
political organizations in support of their position.57  Such inclusion of 
political material, when related to employees’ working conditions, furthers 
workers’ mutual aid or protection.58  Second, courts’ current exclusion of 
                                                     
54 Cf. id. (“[I]f the blogger is promoting the blog to other workers or other 
workers are visiting the site, it may then fall under the protection of the 
NLRA . . . .”). 
55 See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 248 (1997) (noting that 
concerted activity may have been created by another employee’s response to the 
initial email, but that the case did not depend on this).  Other employees’ visits 
to the site may be necessary or even sufficient for concertedness.  See Strege-
Flora, supra note 8, ¶ 12. 
56 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569–70, 575 (1978) (finding the 
distribution of a union newsletter with political content on employer property 
protected because the issues could affect the union’s bargaining position); 
NLRB v. Motorola, Inc, 991 F.2d 278, 280, 285 (5th Cir. 1993) (denying 
protection to employees’ onsite distribution of an outside organization’s 
literature for a city ordinance against random drug testing of employees 
expressing fear of “authoriz[ing] any political splinter group with employee 
members to disseminate literature at the workplace as long as the group’s 
agenda includes some issue relevant to that workplace”); Bill Hylen, Casenote, 
NLRB v. Motorola:  A Narrow Interpretation of the “Mutual Aid or Protection” 
Clause of the National Labor Relations Act, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 260 (1994) 
(criticizing this policy rationale). 
57 See Hylen, supra note 56, at 261–62 (noting that Motorola may handicap 
corporate campaigns by denying section 7 protection to employees who use 
informational literature prepared by outside political advocacy organizations).  
Note that even under a very broad view of legitimate employee interests, 
discussion of some political issues, such as international military aid and 
reproductive rights, would remain unprotected in most workplaces.  Estlund, 
supra note 29, at 969. 
58 See Hylen, supra note 56, at 258 (“The [Motorola] court made a fundamental 
error by emphasizing [the anti-drug-testing organization’s] agenda in 
distributing literature at Motorola, rather than emphasizing the Motorola 
employees’ agenda in distributing literature . . . .  The workers were attempting 
to achieve ‘mutual aid or protection’ . . . .”). 
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concerns such as product quality and the natural environment “reflects an 
impoverished understanding of the meaning of work in our lives.”59  
Certainly, an employee may just write negative things to retaliate against a 
soon-to-be former employer or to blackmail an employer into making labor 
concessions.60  But at a basic level, many employees want their employer to 
prosper so that they will keep their jobs and advance in them.61  Perhaps 
more importantly, it is reasonable to believe many employees want to take 
pride in what they do and to be part of an organization with which they feel 
morally aligned.62  As Professor Cynthia Estlund asks rhetorically, “[C]an it 
fairly be said, as a categorical matter, that the employer’s toxic 
contamination of the surrounding community or the quality of the collective 
work product is of less legitimate concern to employees than, for example, 
the price of soft drinks in employer-provided vending machines?”63  
Although the interpretation of “mutual aid or protection” does not depend 
on the characteristics of blogging, how courts resolve these open issues will 
profoundly influence the effectiveness of blogging as a tool for employee 
organizing. 
¶17 Even with a broad reading of concertedness and “mutual aid or 
protection,” the multitude of posts and comments contained on blogs will 
present an analytical challenge.  On nearly any blog where employees 
frankly discuss their jobs, some posts, examined individually, probably 
“disparage” the employer or its products without explicitly connecting the 
criticism to a labor dispute.  Other gripes probably fall outside the scope of 
“mutual aid or protection” because they do not reveal the “specific 
objective” of changing a particular employment practice.64  However, 
requiring each individual post to meet the standards for protected concerted 
activity would certainly chill communication.65  Instead, if a post at issue 
does not meet the “mutual aid or protection” standard or is an instance of 
product disparagement, courts should consider the entire blog to evaluate 
whether a post is part of a campaign by employees to improve their 
employment conditions and whether readers would reasonably understand 
that purpose.  Such information could be found in the blog’s “About” 
section, in a banner at the top of the blog, or in a “critical mass” of posts 
                                                     
59 Estlund, supra note 29, at 926.  
60 See id. at 930 (referring to “tactical” product disparagement). 
61 Id. at 949. 
62 See id. at 957 (“[E]mployees have a legitimate stake in being part of an 
enterprise that does good and not harm.”). 
63 Id. at 958. 
64 See Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 248. 
65 See Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus:  A Key Institution in the Emerging System 
of Employment Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 167–71 (1993) (describing how 
the “hypertechnical nature” of the doctrines associated with section 7 create 
“traps for the unwary”). 
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that would lead a reasonable reader of the site to understand that the blog 
presents concerns of employees about their working conditions.   
¶18 In summary, there are good reasons to believe that employee blogs 
can and should be protected in many instances as concerted activities under 
section 7 of the NLRA.  In light of that conclusion, blogs raise a number of 
special issues for employers, including surveillance, blogging policies, and 
anonymity. 
II. SPECIAL ISSUES IN NLRA PROTECTION OF BLOGGING 
A.  Prohibition of Employer Surveillance, Impression of Surveillance, 
or Interrogation 
¶19 Retaliation and discrimination on the basis of protected activity are 
obviously “unfair labor practices” under the NLRA,66 but other actions also 
qualify.  Interrogation that has a “coercive effect” when considered in 
context is an unfair labor practice.67  Also, engaging in surveillance of 
union or organizing activity or creating the “impression of surveillance” of 
that activity is an unfair labor practice under some circumstances because it 
can facilitate later unfair labor practices, and if known to employees, it can 
intimidate them out of exercising their rights.68  Although the case law 
addresses unions and organizing campaigns, the same rationales should 
logically apply to surveillance of other concerted activities.   
¶20 The prohibition against surveillance limits how employers can 
respond even to activity that occurs in public.  For example, in cases where 
supervisors spent hours every evening at the village drugstore watching 
handbill distribution69 and where a supervisor abandoned his usual lunch 
restaurant to watch employees solicit union members in the cafeteria,70 
courts found unlawful surveillance.  These were, however, relatively 
extreme cases involving tense union organizing situations.  In most 
                                                     
66 See, e.g., Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. at 244 (ruling that employer 
violated the NLRA by firing employee for protected activity). 
67 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 475 (2005). 
68 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[E]mployer surveillance ‘tends to create fear among employees of future 
reprisal’ and, thus, ‘chills an employee’s freedom to exercise’ his rights under 
federal labor law.” (quoting Cal. Acrylic Indus. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 
(9th Cir. 1998))); ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON 
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 213–14 (2d ed. 
2004) (citing Cannon Elec. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1465 (1965) and Flexsteel Indus., 
Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257 (1993)).  
69 NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir. 1944). 
70 NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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instances when management watches open and public activity, no unfair 
labor practice will be found.71   
¶21 Far from analogous to eavesdropping on a private conversation,72 
management’s visiting a non-secure blog is more like reading an 
advertisement that employees have placed in the local newspaper.  
Information deliberately placed on the Internet is meant to be read, and it 
would be unreasonable to expect employers not to monitor websites where 
they know employees are posting openly and publicly and perhaps exposing 
the company to risk.   
¶22 Even when observation is acceptable, however, recording 
employees’ section 7 activity can be an unfair labor practice unless the 
employer has an objectively reasonable justification for doing so.73  
Therefore, if an employer starts to record the blog’s content each day, it 
may need to provide an objectively reasonable justification for doing so.  
An employer will likely prevail with its justification if it documents daily 
posts to help management piece together the identity of an anonymous 
blogger who is spreading false rumors or leaking confidential information.74  
If, however, the anonymous blogger has shown no propensity to post 
forbidden subject matter, then keeping records of the blog may be 
analogous to an employer photographing employee unionizing activities “in 
the mere belief that something might happen,” which is not allowed.75  
                                                     
71 GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 68, at 215 (“[A]n employer is usually free to 
observe employees engaging in union or other concerted activity that is engaged 
in openly and in public.”). 
72 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(comparing management’s infiltration of the employee’s website to an earlier 
case involving eavesdropping on a break-room conversation). 
73 See Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d at 455.  For example, videotaping 
peaceful union rallies for three months was held an unfair labor practice because 
no valid security interest outweighed the tendency of the cameras to chill 
protected activity.  Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499, 501–02 
(1997), enforced, 156 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  In contrast, when picketers 
had large dogs and were packed shoulder to shoulder across the doors to the 
store, videotaping them and writing down their names was acceptable because 
the employer “had a reasonable basis to have anticipated misconduct that 
justified” the videotaping.  In re Strack & Van Til Supermarkets, 340 N.L.R.B. 
No. 172, 2004–2005 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶16,621, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 13, at 
*24–*25 (2004), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/340/340-172.pdf. 
74 See Alison Grant, Look Out Below:  Higher-ups Are Keeping an Eye on 
Workers, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 15, 2006, at G1. 
75 In re Strack & Van Til, 2004 NLRB LEXIS at *23 (quoting Nat’l Steel & 
Shipbuilding, 324 N.L.R.B. at 499). 
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¶23 Employers might also be said to create an impression of 
surveillance  by speaking to employees about what they read on employee 
blogs.76  One administrative law judge found an impression of surveillance 
when a supervisor told an employee that he “liked her picture” the day after 
it was posted on the union’s website, because this “convey[ed] the 
impression that he was keeping track of her union activities.”77  While this 
reasoning is superficially appealing, it should rarely be applied.  Because 
employers are free to visit the site, to forbid them to notify employees that 
they read blogs would only foster employee carelessness.  Also, if the blog 
can be read as a petition to management to change working conditions, then 
it is entirely appropriate for management to ask for details about the 
concerns expressed, especially if that request is directed towards employees 
as a group, rather than towards individuals.  Therefore, courts should not 
find an unlawful impression of surveillance except in the narrow case when 
reasonable employees would infer that their individual protected activities 
are being tracked for retaliatory purposes.  In considering the 
reasonableness of such an inference, a court would need to look at the 
history of the employer’s behavior towards concerted activities, the 
individualized nature of the remarks, and the lack of legitimate reasons for 
the employer to comment.  Given the public nature of the Internet and the 
legitimate reasons employers have for monitoring what is written about 
them, employer visits to blogs should rarely generate findings of unfair 
labor practices.  
B.  Employee Blogger’s Duty to Screen Comments 
¶24 The comment feature of blogs raises an entirely different set of 
issues.  One blog may contain writing from people with different agendas, 
ethical codes, and levels of self-restraint.  Therefore, comments posted to 
the blog may cause harm that the original blogger never intended, including 
the posting of falsehoods or confidentiality breaches.   
¶25 Someone who merely posts to a blog in no way inviting criticism of 
his employer is probably not engaged in section 7 activity.  However, the 
employer should normally see no reason to penalize him or her for 
                                                     
76 Cf. Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914, 914 (2000) (finding an 
unlawful impression of surveillance when a supervisor asked two employees 
about their conversations with the union organizers who had visited them at the 
jobsite earlier that day). 
77 Magna Int’l, Inc., No. 7-CA-43093(1), 2001 NLRB LEXIS 134, at *61–*62 
(Mar. 9, 2001) (citing Fred’k Wallace & Son, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 914 and 
Flexsteel Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 257, 257 (1993), which explains that “an 
employer creates an impression of surveillance by indicating that it is closely 
monitoring the degree of an employee's union involvement,” regardless of 
whether “the employee intended his involvement to be covert”). 
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unsolicited blog comments unless the employee refuses to take down the 
objectionable material. 
¶26 On the other hand, a blogger who invites criticism of his or her 
employer (e.g., by criticizing the employer, debating the employer’s critics, 
or asking for others’ opinions of the employer) should foresee that others 
will post false accusations or comments that breach confidentiality 
agreements.  Therefore, such a blogger would be negligent not to pre-screen 
comments and should lose protection for those not screened.78  Moreover, 
falsehoods and confidentiality breaches can cause too much harm to allow 
the blogger to avoid liability with a mere disclaimer.79  The problem is that 
if the duty to screen comments is too onerous, an employee blogger is likely 
to turn off the comment feature or not to blog at all, and the employee 
organizing benefits of blogs will be lost.  Existing case law, which 
considers whether an employee has reason to doubt that information he or 
she passes along is false, already balances employers’ interests and 
employee speech.80  Courts should apply this standard to comments that an 
employee blogger screens and extend the standard to confidentiality 
breaches as well as falsehoods.  
C. Employer Blogging Policies  
¶27 In response to concerns about inappropriate blog postings, some 
employers have created policies to tell employees what is prohibited.81  
While it is obviously reasonable to warn employees not to disclose trade 
secrets82 or confidential financial information83 and to require employees to 
                                                     
78 In the case of confidentiality breaches, a blogger may argue that because he 
did not make the original breach of the employer’s confidence, he is not 
responsible for the subsequent dissemination of the information.  However, 
courts should interpret the blogger’s duty of loyalty to prevent him or her from 
magnifying the impact of the breach on the employer.  For a discussion of the 
duty of loyalty, see Lee, supra note 8, ¶¶ 11–23. 
79 Cf. Hutchins, supra note 9, at 46 (noting liability for comment content as a 
concern for companies that put up their own blogs and suggesting a disclaimer). 
80 See discussion supra ¶ 13. 
81 See, e.g., EDELMAN & INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13–14 & app. (discussing 
blog policies from a variety of employers, including Apple and Sun 
Microsystems); NewPR Wiki, BloggingPolicy, 
http://www.thenewpr.com/wiki/pmwiki.php?pagename=Resources.BloggingPoli
cy (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).  For a comparison of several policies, see 
Posting of Fredrik Wackå to Corporateblogging.Info, 
http://www.corporateblogging.info/2005/06/policies-compared-todays-
corporate.asp (June 6, 2005) [hereinafter Wackå]. 
82 See, e.g., Sun.com, Sun Policy on Public Discourse, 
http://www.sun.com/aboutsun/media/blogs/policy.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
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post a disclaimer saying that they do not blog on the company’s behalf,84 
not all policies that regulate employee speech are acceptable under the 
NLRA.  This section will describe the general rules regarding such policies 
and then examine a few examples of actual or potential blogging policies. 
¶28 In general, promulgating a policy that “would reasonably tend to 
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights” is an unfair labor 
practice.85  Policies previously ruled unlawful in non-blogging contexts 
include “confidentiality” policies that forbid employees from discussing 
terms and conditions of employment with each other or customers86 and 
policies forbidding union solicitation in the workplace during non-working 
time, even without evidence that employees are unable to communicate 
outside of the workplace.87  Still, particular prohibitions on “profane 
language,”88 “harassment,”89 and “slanderous or detrimental statements”90 
in the workplace have been upheld on the grounds that a reasonable 
employee would see such rules as directed to the employer’s legitimate 
concerns, rather than as a bar on protected activity.91  In Adtranz ABB 
Daimler-Benz Transportation, N.A. v. NLRB, 92 the D.C. Circuit held that 
                                                                                                                       
2006) (“[I]t’s perfectly OK to talk about your work and have a dialog with the 
community, but it’s not OK to publish the recipe for one of our secret sauces.”). 
83 See, e.g., id.  (“Talking about revenue, future product ship dates, roadmaps, or 
our share price is apt to get you, or the company, or both, into legal trouble.”); 
see also Wackå, supra note 81. 
84 See, e.g., Feedster, Corporate Blogging Policy, (Mar. 7, 2005), 
http://feedster.blogs.com/corporate/2005/03/corporate_blogg.html (“Please 
make it clear to your readers that the views you express are yours alone and that 
they do not necessarily reflect the views of Feedster.”). 
85 Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 
(D.C. Cir. 1999).  Employers also may not enforce a facially valid policy in a 
way that discriminates against protected concerted activities.  See 1 DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW, supra note 35, at 106 (explaining this for no-solicitation rules).   
86 See, e.g., Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1172 (1990) 
(“We, therefore, conclude that the judge erred in failing to find that the 
Respondent's rule [is an unfair labor practice] because it restricts employees’ 
Section 7 rights to communicate not only with the employee-parents, but with 
all parents.”); King, supra note 36, at 859 (predicting that such policies will also 
be prohibited in the Internet context). 
87 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798–99 (1945), 
interpreted in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570–71 (1978). 
88 Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 2004–2005 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) ¶16,786, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 664, at *6–*7 (2004). 
89 Id. at *14. 
90 Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002). 
91 Cf. King, supra note 36, at 856 (applying similar logic to confidentiality 
policies).  
92 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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employers may prohibit “abusive or threatening” language at work,93 but 
acknowledged that discriminatory enforcement of such a policy could be an 
unfair labor practice.94 
¶29 A company might want to forbid its employees to discuss the 
employer on the Internet at all, but this is almost certainly unlawful.95  
Because other means of communication are not nearly equivalent to 
blogging, the employer’s rule could easily be described as an “unreasonable 
impediment to self-organization”96 that denies employees “an essential 
component of . . . communication.”97 
¶30 One company’s proposed blogging policy states, “You may not post 
any material that is obscene, defamatory, profane, libelous, threatening, 
harassing, abusive, hateful or embarrassing to another person 
or . . . entity.”98  This policy has much in common with the one in Adtranz, 
except that in Adtranz, the restrictions applied only to the workplace, but 
this policy applies to speech outside of work.  The balancing of employer 
and employee interests is likely to be similar, however, because the policy is 
facially neutral towards section 7 activity.  Employees can blog about 
working conditions without using outrageous language, and employers have 
legitimate interests in not having their public image tarnished or the 
relationships between their employees damaged by inappropriate material 
that employee bloggers post on the Internet.  Moreover, a reasonable 
employee is likely to understand the rationale for the policy and thus not see 
it as a prohibition of protected activity.  The only major concern is the word 
“embarrassing” because any public criticism of the employer is arguably 
                                                     
93 Id. at 28 (“[T]he Board’s position that the imposition of a broad prophylactic 
rule against abusive and threatening language is unlawful on its face is simply 
preposterous.”). 
94 Id. at 27–28. 
95 Apple Computer has been rumored to have such a policy.  EDELMAN & 
INTELLISEEK, supra note 2, at 13; Think Secret, Inside Apple Retail: Pixel 
Policy, Price Matching, Employee Restrictions, 
http://www.thinksecret.com/news/0508retail.html (Aug. 5, 2005). 
96 See Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1187 (1943) (“[I]n the 
absence of special circumstances, a rule prohibiting union activity on company 
property outside of working time constitutes an unreasonable impediment to 
self-organization . . . .”). 
97 See Bureau of National Affairs, No. 5-CA-28860, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS 
68, at *18–*19 (Oct. 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/z100300_bureauofnatio
nal.asp (discussing why the availability of other forms of communication failed 
to justify an employer’s ban on email solicitations). 
98 Plaxoed!, Plaxo’s Communication (Blogging) Policy, 
http://blog.plaxoed.com/?p=41 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
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embarrassing.  The validity of this particular prohibition is likely to depend 
upon whether it is, in fact, applied to prevent section 7 activities.   
¶31 Another company, Sun Microsystems, warns employees that “using 
your weblog to trash or embarrass the company, our customers, or your co-
workers, is not only dangerous but stupid.”99  Courts examine policy 
provisions in their overall context,100 and this particular remark comes after 
a description of the harm the company would suffer if a prospective 
customer were to read an employee post saying that a Sun product 
“sucks.”101  Employees complaining about their working conditions could 
certainly be seen as “trashing” the company, and the tone of the language is 
somewhat threatening, but the example given and the title of the section 
(“Think About Consequences”) indicate that Sun is interested in warning 
employees not to post thoughtless, “amateurish” remarks.102  While the 
validity of this provision, standing alone, might be a closer call than the 
previous two examples, the provision is probably acceptable under the 
NLRA when viewed in the context of the overall policy. 
¶32 Finally, an employer probably cannot mandate that employees 
utilize other channels of communication before blogging,103 especially 
when employees are “legitimately concerned about reprisals,”104 because 
management does not have the prerogative to dictate how concerted activity 
will be performed.105  The existing doctrines that control employer 
restrictions on employee communications are thus easily adaptable to the 
analysis of blogging policies. 
D.  Employers Seeking an Anonymous Blogger’s Identity 
¶33 Anonymous blogging raises issues that NLRA case law has not yet 
addressed thoroughly.  Many bloggers and comment posters take more or 
less elaborate strategies to conceal their identities, such as pseudonyms, 
public computers, proxy servers, or even encrypted email to an anonymous 
                                                     
99 Sun Policy on Public Discourse, supra note 82. 
100 See, e.g., Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002). 
 (“Employees would not reasonably believe that an expectation that they 
represent the Company in a ‘positive and ethical manner,’ in the context of a 
prohibition on conflicts of interest, would prohibit Section 7 activity.”).  
101 Sun Policy on Public Discourse, supra note 82. 
102 Id. 
103 Cf. Plaxoed!, supra note 98 (“Voicing concerns about Plaxo publicly without 
first communicating such concerns to your management and co-workers is 
counterproductive and inadvisable.”). 
104 Ogihara Am. Corp., No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555, at *44 (Nov. 
3, 2005), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD-
80-05.pdf.  
105 Id. at *47–*48. 
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hosting company.106  An employer may sue an anonymous blogger and 
subpoena Internet service providers (ISPs) to get the IP address and the 
location of the blogger’s computer,107 but if the lawsuit is groundless, and 
the post is protected concerted activity, the suit will be an unfair labor 
practice.108  Also, because filing a lawsuit is time-consuming, expensive, 
and possibly ineffective, some employers will likely use strategies such as 
surveillance and interrogation to determine bloggers’ identities.  Although 
an employer may want to know who is raising concerns, the value of 
anonymity in allowing employees to communicate without fear of reprisals 
should cause courts to view critically the employer’s motivations for 
interrogations, lawsuits, and other tactics to uncover bloggers’ identities. 
¶34 Ogihara America Corp.109 vividly demonstrates an employer’s 
aggressive offline tactics to find the source of an anonymous 
communication.  In that case, an employer subpoenaed a Kinko’s security 
tape to learn the identity of an employee who had sent an anonymous FedEx 
on behalf of himself and two co-workers complaining about their 
supervisor’s incompetence.110  The manager’s questioning of employees 
regarding the anonymous package was an unfair labor practice because the 
questions showed management to be “hostile to” the concerted activity,111 
especially coming “in the midst of a hotly contested union campaign.”112  
The employee’s denial that he sent the letter did not justify firing him 
because “an employee is under no obligation to respond to questions that 
seek to uncover his protected activities.”113  Similarly, interrogation of 
employees and the use of drastic measures to uncover bloggers’ identities 
are likely to be unfair labor practices when the posts are protected concerted 
                                                     
106 See Zuckerman, How to Blog Anonymously, in HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS 
AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS, supra note 6, at 55, 57–62; see also Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, How to Blog Safely (About Work or Anything Else) (Apr. 6, 2005), 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/blog-anonymously.php (describing 
Invisiblog.com, Tor, and Anonymizer.com). 
107 See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. 2005); Lee, 
supra note 8, ¶¶ 30–40; Zuckerman, supra note 106, at 57.  Courts balance the 
First Amendment protection of anonymous speech against the rights of victims 
of defamation, breach of the duty of loyalty, and other torts.  See Cahill, 884 
A.2d at 461; Lee, supra note 8, ¶¶ 24–35. 
108 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“An employer’s filing or threatened filing of a lawsuit against an employee 
concerning union organizing activities may, under certain circumstances, violate 
the RLA [Railway Labor Act].”).  Note that the RLA is closely analogous to the 
NLRA.  Strege-Flora, supra note 8, ¶ 7.   
109 No. 7-CA-47942, 2005 NLRB LEXIS 555. 
110 Id. at *20–*21. 
111 Id. at *61. 
112 Id. at *51. 
113 Id. at *45. 
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activity and the court infers a motive to retaliate against those engaged in 
protected activities.  How courts respond to employer attempts to obtain the 
identities of anonymous bloggers will be one of the most interesting 
developments in this area of the law. 
E.  The Structure of the Workplace 
¶35 One final idea merits discussion.  The NLRB has analyzed the 
structure of the individual workplace in recent technology cases, including 
general counsel memoranda about employer email and cell phone 
policies114 and a Board decision about whether an employer must furnish a 
union with a list of employee email addresses.115  It might be argued that 
courts should also consider the structure of a given workplace when 
deciding how vigorously to protect a particular instance of employee 
blogging.  Obviously, when employees are spread across many locations, or 
when they spend little or no time at employer facilities, the Internet may be 
the only practicable way for them to communicate.116  In those cases, the 
employee’s interest in section 7 activities is clearly strong relative to the 
employer’s interest in avoiding damage to its reputation.  In contrast, 
employees who work mostly in the same physical location may simply be 
                                                     
114 See, e.g., Banca Di Roma, No. 13-CA-41283-1, 2004 WL 3093490, at *2 
(Nov. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/13-CA-41283-1(11-26-
04).htm (upholding employer ban on cell phones in workplace because 
employer’s concern about distractions outweighed employee section 7 concerns 
in workplace where employees could often speak to each other in person); 
Encompass Servs. Corp., No. 17-CA-20907, 2001 NLRB GCM LEXIS 1, at *6 
(Jan. 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/admemo/admemo/s011801_encompass.as
p?bhcp=1 (finding that construction employees who “do not use email or the 
Internet to be productive” can be subject to ban on email solicitation); Pratt & 
Whitney, No. 12-CA-18446, 1998 WL 1112978, at *2, *4 (Feb. 23, 1998) 
(finding that employees’ extensive use of email made the email system a “work 
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airing dirty laundry that they could discuss in private to accomplish the 
same goals. 
¶36 Such a distinction for the structure of the workplace, which would 
add yet another layer of complexity to the concerted activity doctrines, is 
unnecessary and undesirable.  All employees have an interest in a blog’s 
ability to reach the public, to archive commentary, and to link to further 
resources on the Internet.  It would be very difficult to apply a rule 
protecting employees’ concerted appeals when they are directed at the 
public, but protecting concerted activities directed at other employees only 
when the Internet is essential for the communication. 
CONCLUSION 
¶37 Blogs will add a new twist to established concerted activity doctrine 
as courts will have to strike the balance between employee and employer 
rights.  Courts should strongly protect all employee bloggers as they engage 
in legitimate concerted activity, but they should also require that bloggers 
bear some responsibility in exercising those rights by identifying 
themselves as employees and screening comments for obvious falsehoods 
and confidentiality breaches.  Existing standards of protection against 
interference with protected rights often extend readily into the blogging 
context.  Though highly fact-specific, these standards must be applied 
conscientiously to protect employees’ legitimate appeals to the public and 
attempts to discuss employment issues, while avoiding unreasonable 
restrictions on employers’ needs to monitor what is said about them and 
promulgate policies to protect their legitimate business interests. 
